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Abstract
This paper analyses the implications of heteroscedasticity for optimal macroeco-
nomic policy and welfare. We nd that changes in the variance structure driven by
exogenous processes like GARCH a¤ect welfare but not the optimal feedback rule. How-
ever, changes in the variance structure driven by state-dependent processes a¤ect both.
We also derive Certainty-Equivalent Transformations of state-dependent volatility mod-
els that allow standard quadratic dynamic programming algorithms to be employed to
study optimal policy. These results are illustrated numerically using a reduced-form
model of the U.S. economy in which changes in volatility are driven by a GARCH
process and the rate of ination
Keywords: Heteroscedasticity, Optimal Control, Macroeconomic Volatility, Optimal
Monetary Policy.
JEL classication: C32, C61, E52
1 Introduction
This paper explores the implications of heteroscedastic disturbances for the analysis of op-
timal policy. Our analysis is based on the observation that most time-varying volatility
models are essentially quadratic and therefore t nicely into the linear-quadratic frame-
work of the optimal linear regulator problem, allowing a rigorous analysis of their policy
implications.
Correspondence to: Vito Polito, Department of Economics, 3 East, University of Bath, Bath, BA2 7AY,
UK. E-mail: v.polito@bath.ac.uk
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Three key ndings emerge from this research. First, the certainty-equivalence (CE)
principle still holds in macroeconomic models with heteroscedastic disturbances if changes
in the variance structure are exogenous. Examples of this type include ARCH, GARCH or
stochastic volatility processes that, like homoscedastic volatility, inuence the welfare loss
but not the optimal policy.
Second, we nd that when changes in the variance structure are related to the variables
describing the state of the economy, the CE principle no longer holds and the specication
of the variance structure does inuence the optimal decision rule. State-dependent models
of the variance structure are extensively used in the literature on the term structure of
interest rates and have been employed more recently in macroeconomic models. They
allow the variance of the shocks to depend in both a linear and a quadratic way upon
the state variables. The classic example is the Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985) square root
volatility model, in which the variance depends linearly upon the nominal rate of interest.
Dothan (1978) and Courtadon (1982) develop models in which the variance is a quadratic
function of the interest rate. Engle (1982) uses lagged values of the regressors as a way of
generalizing ARCH variance specications. Recent examples of macro-nance models with
a state-dependent variance component include Spencer (2008), Bekaert, Cho and Moreno
(2010) and Campbell et al. (2014). We show that there is a hierarchy of e¤ects if the error
structure is heteroscedastic. Quadratic state dependence a¤ects all of the coe¢ cients in the
optimal feedback rule, as well as welfare. Linear state dependence a¤ects the intercept of
the optimal feedback rule and welfare. GARCH reinforces these state-dependent e¤ects.
However, on its own, GARCH only a¤ects welfare.
Third, we derive a Certainty-Equivalent Transformation (CET) of the heteroscedastic
optimal linear regulator problem with state-dependent volatility. This uses change of vari-
able techniques to write the problem as in the canonical homoscedastic form. This allows
researchers to use standard optimal control techniques to analyze optimal policy rules and
welfare losses. The transformation shows that state dependent volatility changes the e¤ec-
tive welfare cost of variables like ination and interest rates that may inuence volatility.
CETs of dynamic optimization problems are common in both nance and macroeconomics.
Hansen and Sargent (2008) provide a textbook description of these in the context for robust
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optimal control of models with dynamic misspecication. Our work complements theirs by
examining the e¤ect of stochastic misspecication.
We illustrate the theoretical results numerically using a small-scale VAR model of the
U.S. economy as a laboratory to revisit one of the most popular applications of dynamic
programming in macroeconomics: the analysis of optimal monetary policy. The model is
estimated by Maximum Likelihood (ML). The variance structure of the VAR includes both
GARCH and ination-dependent components that are highly signicant statistically. This
specication is consistent with the Okun-Friedman-Ball hypothesis that macroeconomic
uncertainty is related to the rate of ination, see Okun (1971), Friedman (1977) and Ball
(1992). Fountas, Karanasos and Kim (2002) and Caporale and Kontonikas (2009) argue
that an increase in ination should lead to a monetary tightening response to limit the
increase in macroeconomic volatility. Our model formalizes this proposition and provides
an argument for a low ination target as well as a more aggressive response to ination
shocks.1 Our numerical results show how misspecication of the variance structure can
lead researchers to mismeasuring both the welfare cost of ination and the potential gains
from optimization.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2, supported by Appendices A and B,
sets out the general solution of the optimal linear regulator problem with heteroscedastic
disturbances; shows how this depends upon the source of heteroscedasticity; and derives the
CET under state dependence. Section 3, supported by Appendices B, C and D, describes
the empirical application used to illustrate the theoretical results. Section 4 concludes by
summarizing the ndings of this research. Appendix F suggests extensions of the model
framework and highlights avenues for future research.2
2 Optimal control of heteroscedastic macroeconomic models
This section presents a general framework for optimization problems with linear-quadratic
heteroscedasticity, based on the Bellman equation. This includes expectations of quadratic
1There are arguments that point in the opposite direction, suggesting a higher target (Blanchard et al
(2010)) and a less aggressive response (Sack (2000)).
2Appendices are available online.
3
forms in the state variables, which involve both means and variances. Since the latter are
linear-quadratic functions of the state variables, the value function remains quadratic and
the decision rules linear.
2.1 Specication
Let  2 (0; 1) be a discount factor and Et denoting mathematical expectation conditional
on information available in period t. Consider a decision maker that wants to choose an
innite sequence of controls fitg1t=0 to minimize the quadratic loss function
Vt =
1X
t=0
tEt
24 (xt   x)0R (xt   x) + (it   i)0W (it   i)
+2 (xt   x)0H (it   i)
35 (1)
subject to the rst-order stochastic linear di¤erence equation
xt+1 = Axt + Bit + wt+1 (2)
with x0 given. In the above, xt is a n  1 vector of state or non-policy variables; it is a
q  1 vector of control or policy variables; R is a n n positive denite symmetric matrix;
W is a q  q non-negative denite symmetric matrix; H is a n  q matrix; x and i are
vectors of targets of dimension n and q respectively; A is a n n matrix of coe¢ cients; B
is a n q matrix of coe¢ cients; and wt+1 is a n 1 vector of independently and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) random variables with mean vector zero and heteroscedastic covariance
matrix
t+1 = K + C
0wtw0tC + G
0tG + Lx0ts + Qx
0
tSxt; (3)
with w0 and 0 given. The ve terms on the right side of (3) denote the homoscedastic,
ARCH, GARCH, linear and quadratic state-dependent components of the covariance matrix
respectively: K is a positive denite n n matrix; C, G, L and Q are n n matrices that
are not necessarily symmetric.3 The vector s and the matrix S = ss0 select the variable(s)
3We assume that the su¢ cient conditions for the stability of the solution to the linear regulator prob-
lem are met, namely (i) the matrices B= B CR 1H0 and C are stabilizable and (ii) the matrices
=  HR 1H0 and R are positive semidenite. See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), Appendix B.3,
which transforms the system by removing the o¤ diagonal H terms to get B and , and pages 116-118
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entering the linear and quadratic components of the covariance matrix respectively.
A wide range of macro models can be written in the form of the rst-order stochastic
linear di¤erence equation (2). For example, equation (2) can describe the non-policy part of
VAR models such as those used for the measurement of macroeconomic shocks by Bernanke
and Mihov (1998); and for optimal control by Sack (2000) and Polito and Wickens (2012).
It encompasses the Rudebusch and Svenssons (1999) central bank model, which has been
extensively employed for the analysis of U.S. monetary policy. Equation (2) is also consistent
with the solution of a linear rational expectations model, as in Blanchard and Kahn (1980)
for example.
Further, the specication of the covariance matrix in equation (3) includes classes of
time-varying volatility models widely employed in macroeconomics and nance. For exam-
ple, it encompasses Engel (1982)s model, which exhibits ARCH and ination-conditional
dependence; and the constant-covariance version of the BEKK model of Engle and Kroner
(1995). The linear state-dependent component of the covariance matrix encompasses mod-
els in which time-varying volatility is related to a state variable. Prominent examples of this
include, the Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985) model where volatility is linked to the nominal
rate of interest; the ination-conditional volatility model postulated by the Okun-Friedman-
Ball hypothesis and the macro-nance model formulated by Campbell et al. (2014) in which
volatility is linked to the output gap. Dothan (1978) and Courtadon (1982) give examples
of quadratic state-dependent volatility models where the driving factor is the nominal rate
of interest.
2.2 General solution
To nd the policy function we need to express the optimal value of the original problem given
arbitrary initial conditions. In a standard homoscedastic quadratic dynamic programming
problem, the value function includes a constant term (for the steady-state variance) and
the state vector x0 (for any initial disequilibrium). This can also allow for linear-quadratic
which then applies the stability conditions. These assumptions imply that the solutions to the homoscedas-
tic and the GARCH optimal linear regulator problems - which are both certainty equivalent - are stable.
In section 2.2.4, we use the CET to infer that the stability properties of the optimal solution are preserved
under state-dependent volatility.
5
(LQ) terms in the dynamic specication of the variance structure. The presence of ARCH
and GARCH terms in (3) implies that the value function depends also on the initial values
for w0 and 0. Thus we try a value function of the form:
V = V (x;w;) = k   2x0p + x0Px + c0ww0c + g0g; (4)
where k is a scalar; P is a nn positive semidenite symmetric matrix, p, c and g are n1
vectors.4 After using the transition law (2) and the covariance matrix (3) to eliminate next
periods states in (1), taking expectations and recognizing that the vector w is orthogonal
to x and i, the Bellman equation becomes:
Homoscedastic Bellman equationz }| {
V = min
i
f(x  x)0R (x  x) + (i  i)0W (i  i) + 2 (x  x)0H(i  i) + k + I
+
h
tr(PC0ww0C) + c0(K + C0ww0C)c
i
| {z }
ARCH e¤ect
+
h
tr
 
PG0G

+ g0(K + C0ww0C + G0G)g + c0G0Gc
i
| {z }
Additional GARCH e¤ect
+ tr(PL)x0s| {z }
Linear dependence e¤ect
+ tr (PQ) x0Sx| {z }
Quadratic dependence e¤ect
+ 

c0Lc + g0Lg

x0s| {z }
Linear + ARCH/GARCH e¤ect
+ 

c0Qc + g0Qg

x0Sx| {z }
Quadratic + ARCH/GARCH e¤ect
g, (5)
where
I = tr (PK)  2 (Ax + Bi)0 p +  (Ax + Bi)0P (Ax + Bi) :
The rst line in the Bellman equation shows the terms found in a standard homoscedastic
problem; the next two lines arise if there are ARCH or GARCH terms in the covariance
structure; the fourth line shows the e¤ect of state-dependent components and the last line
shows the interaction if both of these e¤ects are present. The rst-order necessary condition
for the minimum problem on the right side of equation (5) yields the optimal linear feedback
4We omit time subscripts in an equation whenever it includes only variables observed in the same period.
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rule for the policy vector i:
i = f   Fx (6)
f =
 
W + B0PB
 1  
Wi + H0x + B0p

(7)
F=
 
W + B0PB
 1  
H0 + B0PA

: (8)
After substituting the trial solution (4) into the left side of equation (5) and the optimizer
(6) - (8) into the right side, collection of the coe¢ cients for the quadratic terms in x and
those for w and  gives:
P = R + A0PA   H + A0PB  W + B0PB 1  H0 + B0PA (9)
+tr (PQ) S + c0QcS + g0QgS
cc0 = C
 
P+cc0+gg0

C0 (10)
gg0 = G(P + cc0 + gg0)G0. (11)
Equating the coe¢ cients for the linear terms gives
p =

I  (A BF)0 1
8<: (R  F0H0) x   (F0W  H) i 12 [tr (PL) + c0Lc + g0Lg] s
9=; , (12)
while collecting the constant terms gives
k = (1  ) 1 (f   i)0W (f   i) + x0 [Rx   2H (f   i)] (13)
+ f 0B0 (PBf   2p) + [tr(PK) + c0Kc + g0Kg]:
Equation (9) is a matrix Riccati di¤erence equation for the symmetric matrix P, while
(10) and (11) are discrete Lyapunov equations for the square matrices gg0 and cc0 respec-
tively. This system can be solved by numerical iteration, starting from initial values for P,
g and c. This is recursive: given the solution for P in (9) the solutions for g and c are
obtained by joint numerical iteration of (10) and (11). Substituting P, g and c into (12)
and (13) then gives the solutions for p and k.
7
Equations (6) to (13) show the solution to the heteroscedastic optimal control problem.
This encompasses a number of special cases that are now discussed separately to highlight
how alternative specications of the variance structure might alter the optimal feedback
rule.5
2.2.1 Homoscedastic variance
If the variance structure is homoscedastic then equation (3) reduces to t+1 = K; the trial
solution is V (x) = k   2x0p + x0Px; and the Bellman equation in (5) includes only the
rst line since the matrices A, G, L and Q are zero matrices and the vectors g and c are
both null vectors. Di¤erentiation with respect to the policy vector i yields the same optimal
feedback rule as in equations (6) - (8), but with:
P^ = R + A0P^A 

H + A0P^B

W + B0P^B
 1 
H0 + B0P^A

(14)
p^ =

I  (A BF)0 1  R  F0H0x    F0W  H i (15)
and
k^ = f(f   i)0W (f   i)+x0 [Rx   2H (f   i)]+f 0B0

P^Bf   2p^

+tr

P^K

g (1  ) 1 :
The solutions P^ and p^ are independent of the variance structure, therefore implying that
the optimal feedback rule satises the CE principle.
2.2.2 GARCH variance
When the variance structure is driven by a GARCH process, equation (3) reduces to t+1 =
K + A0wtw0tA + G
0tG. The trial solution is given by (4), being di¤erent from that used
for the homoscedastic case. The Bellman equation in (5) does not include the last two lines
since the matrices L and Q are both equal to zero matrices. The solutions for P and p are
still given by the equations (14) and (15). Thus the policy rule is as in the homoscedastic
case.
5Appendix A provides more details on the computation of the solution in equations (6) to (13).
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This result shows that under GARCH volatility the CE principle still holds, since the
feedback rule in equations (6) - (8) is identical to the decision rule for the corresponding
nonstochastic linear regulator problem.6 Consequently the conditions su¢ cient for the
stability of the solution to the homoscedastic optimal control problem are also su¢ cient
for the stability of the solution with GARCH. This however a¤ects welfare. Relative to
the homoscedastic case, the value function (4) includes the non-negative terms g0ww0g and
c0c. In addition, the constant k changes under GARCH, as it includes the positive term
 (g0Kg + c0Kc) that increases the welfare loss because K is positive denite.
2.2.3 State dependence
The CE principle no longer holds if the variance structure includes linear and quadratic
state-dependent components. Comparing (12) with (15) we can see that linear state de-
pendence means that the last term in the square brackets on the right side of equation
(12) is not zero. This shifts p and hence the intercepts f in the optimal feedback rule
through (7). This shift is the sum of two e¤ects. The rst is direct, working through the
term 12tr (PL) s that occurs whenever there is linear state dependence in the variance
structure. The second term  12 (c0Lc + g0Lg) s is a secondary e¤ect that arises only when
there is both GARCH and linear state dependence. Importantly, because L does not appear
in the solution for P given by equations (9) - (11), linear state dependence does not a¤ect
the response coe¢ cients F in (8). However, it a¤ects the welfare loss from (4) as it changes
p and consequently the constant term k in (13).
The impact of quadratic state dependence can be seen by comparing the solutions for P
in equations (9) and (14). Under quadratic dependence, the term Q is no longer zero. This
adds three extra terms on the right side of P in equations (9). The rst, 12tr (PQ) S, is a
direct e¤ect that occurs whenever there is quadratic state dependence. The next two terms,
c0QcS and g0QgS, show a secondary e¤ect on the response coe¢ cients that occurs if
there are both quadratic and GARCH components in the variance structure. Since PQ
is positive semi-denite, and c0Qc and g0Qg are non-negative, these three terms are non-
6This result also applies to other time-varying specications of the volatility that, like GARCH, are
exogenous to the state variables, as for example the stochastic volatility and GARCH-X specication.
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negative. They shiftP through (9) and therefore p through (12). This a¤ects the coe¢ cients
f and F in the optimal feedback rule through (7) and (8) and hence the welfare loss through
(4).
In summary, there is a hierarchy of e¤ects if the error structure is heteroscedastic.
Quadratic state dependence a¤ects all the coe¢ cients in the optimal feedback rule as well
as welfare. Linear state dependence a¤ects the intercept of the optimal feedback rule and
welfare. GARCH can reinforce these e¤ects, but on its own this only a¤ects welfare.
2.2.4 The Certainty-Equivalent Transform (CET)
Although the CE principle does not hold under linear-quadratic state-dependent volatility,
a CET of the Bellman equation can be obtained by appropriately consolidating the linear
and quadratic terms of the variance structure with the linear and quadratic terms in the
objective function of the decision maker. This allows the value function to be expressed in
the canonical homoscedastic form. Standard dynamic programming algorithms can then be
used to solve problems that do not satisfy CE. We derive the CET for the general case of
the heteroscedastic variance structure in equation (3).
The Bellman equation (5) can be re-parametrized in a certainty-equivalent form by
setting L and Q to zero and replacing the welfare parameters R, x, i in (1) and k in (4)
with eR, ex, ei and ek to obtain the re-parametrized objective function:
1X
t=0
tEt
24 (xt   ex)0 eR (xt   ex) + it  ei0W it  ei
+2 (xt   ex)0Hit  ei
35 ; (16)
where
eR = R+ tr (PQ) + c0Qc + g0QgS
ex = [eR HW 1H0] 1f(R HW 1H0)x   1
2
s[tr(PL) + c0Lc + g0Lg]g
ei = i + W 1H0(x   ex)
ek = k +  1[x0Rx   ex0 eRex   (i  ei)0W(i  ei)  2ex0HW 1H0(x   ex)]:
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It then follows that the trial solution can be expressed as
eV (x;w;) = ek   2x0ep + x0ePx + c0ww0c + g0g (17)
and the certainty-equivalent Bellman equation can be written as:
eV = min
i
[(x  ex)0 eR (x  ex) + (i ei)0W(i ei) + 2 (x  ex)0H(i ei) (18)
+ ek+I+tr((ePC0ww0C)+tr(ePG0G)
+ c0(K + C0ww0C + G0G)c + g0(K + C0ww0C + G0G)g],
where I still dened as in section 2.2, with eP and ep replacing P and p respectively. Equation
(18) shows that after transformation the Bellman equation has the same structure as in the
GARCH model and thus satises the CE principle.
Appendix B derives the CET and shows that the Bellman equations in (5) and (18)
are mathematically equivalent. Di¤erentiation of (18) with respect to the vector of policy
instruments i yields the feedback rule (6) but with coe¢ cients determined as:
ef =  W + B0PB 1 Wei + H0ex + B0ep (19)
eF=W + B0ePB 1 H0 + B0ePA : (20)
where:
eP = ~R + A0ePA  H + A0ePBW + B0ePB 1 H0 + B0ePA ; (21)
ep = I  (A BF)0 1 h~R  F0H0 ex    F0W  Heii : (22)
The solution to the transformed problem is equivalent to that in equations (6) to (13). The
denition of eR implies that the solution for P from (9) is the same as the solution for eP
from (21). Thus eF = F. The equality between p and ep is shown by replacing ex and ei in
(22) and then simplifying. Substitution of ex and ei into (20) shows that ~f = f . Thus the
policy rules from the general and the transformed control problem are the same. The value
functions (4) and (17) di¤er by a constant, but this does not a¤ect the decision rules.
11
The CET shows how heteroscedasticity a¤ects the optimal policy. Since Q is non-
negative denite, the scalar [tr(PQ) + c0Qc + g0Qg] in eR is non-negative and adds to the
welfare weights of the variables identied by the selection vector s (and hence the matrix
S = ss0). Similarly the non-negative scalar [tr(PL) + c0Lc + g0Lg] in ex and the selection
vector s shift the intercept vector in (19).
The solution under the CET is stable since the matrix eR is positive semidenite while
the matrix W is unchanged in the transformed problem.
3 An illustrative empirical model
3.1 Data and model
We specify a second order VAR model of the U.S. economy based on 242 observations from
1953:1 to 2013:2 of unemployment (ut), ination (t) and the rate of interest (rt).7
Let zt =
h
y0t rt
i0
, with yt =
h
ut t
i0
denoting the block of non-policy variables,
and et =
h
e0yt ert
i0
denoting the corresponding vector of residuals. Then the VAR model
can be written as:
zt+1 = 1zt + 2zt 1 + et (23)
with 1 =
h
11 
2
1
i0
and 2 =
h
12 
2
2
i0
. The residuals can be written as et+1 =
t+1vt+1, with vt  N (0; I), and their variance, E[t+10t+1jzt; et;
t], as:

t+1 = 
0 + 
1z
0
ts + 
2z
0
tSzt + Mete
0
tM
0+N
tN0 (24)
where 
0, 
1 and 
2 are 3 3 real and symmetric matrices; M and N are 3 3 real and
diagonal matrices; s0 =
h
0 1 0
i
so that z0ts =t; and z0tSzt=2t (since S = ss
0).
Equation (24) describes an encompassing (EN) model of the variance structure that
nests four alternative models of volatility: the homoscedastic (HO) model (
t =
0);
the linear-dependence (LN) model (
t+1 =
0+
1z0ts); the linear-quadratic (LQ) model
7We use the civilian unemployment rate for all workers over the age of 16; the annual percentage change
in the implicit GDP price deator; and the three-month Treasury bills. The data are demeaned, consistent
with (2). The data are from http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2.
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(
t+1 =
0+
1z0ts+
2z0tSzt); and the pure GARCH (GH) model (
t+1 = 
0+Mete0tM0+N
tN0).
The unconditional covariance matrix of the residuals 
 is determined from the uncon-
ditional expectations on the right side of (24), as explained in Appendix C.1. Since 
 is
a real symmetric positive denite matrix, the triangular factorization 
 = TDT0 applies,
where T is a 3  3 lower triangular matrix with u, ru and r being the o¤-diagonal
items and D is a 3 3 diagonal matrix with uu,  and rr in the main diagonal.
3.2 Optimal monetary policy
The Fed chooses the sequence frtg1t=0 that minimizes the loss function
1X
t=0
[uu
2
t + 
2
t + r (rt)
2];
where u2t , 
2 and (r)2 are the volatility of unemployment, ination and changes in the
policy instrument; while u,  and r are weights attached to each of the three goals
respectively.8 The optimization is subject to the constraints described by the non-policy
block of the VAR in equations (23) and (24). As described in Appendix C.2, this is a
special case of the general model in sections 2.1 and 2.2. Using these restrictions to simplify
equation (16) and eR, ex, ei and ek gives the CET of the loss function
1X
t=0

n
uu
2
t +
e (t   e) + r h(rt   er)2 + (rt 1   er)2   2rt 1rtio
where
e =  + [tr (PQ) + c0Qc + g0Qg]  
e =  [tr (PL) +c0Lc + g0Lg]=2e
er = e
ek = (1  ) 1 tr(PK)   1e(e)2:
8Woodford (2003) shows that quadratic loss functions provide a good approximation to the expected
lifetime utility of a representative household derived from a fully micro-founded macroeconomic model of
the economy, in which ination brings e¢ ciency costs by distorting relative prices.
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The re-parametrization, based on the solution in Appendix B, illustrates the e¤ect of
GARCH and state-dependent volatility on the optimal feedback rule. The term tr(PQ) 0,
due to the presence of quadratic dependence in (24), makes policy more aggressive as would
an increase in the welfare weight . GARCH further reinforces this e¤ect since both c0Qc
and g0Qg are non-negative. The linear dependence term L reduces the e¤ective target on
ination and interest rates from er =  = 0 to er = ~  0 since tr(PL)  0. Provided
that   0 then ~   (since   ~): Thus linear dependence reduces the e¤ective
target and steady-state ination and interest rates as a reduction in  would. This e¤ect
is reinforced by the presence of GARCH as both c0Lc and g0Lg are non-negative. Further
the intercept in the value function shifts from k to ek but, as noted, this does not a¤ect the
decision rule.
The optimal feedback rule can be combined with the non-policy block equations to study
the dynamic of the VAR model under the optimal policy. We denote the VAR models under
the optimal feedback rule as HO, LN, LQ, GH, EN.9
We write the steady-state solution to the policy rate equation as r = +uu+, with
, u and  denoting the long-run coe¢ cients of the policy rule. In particular,  = 0 for
models based on mean-adjusted data, but can be non-zero when the steady-state is shifted
by the linear dependence e¤ect under the optimal rule. With r =  =  and u = 0 we have
 = =(1   ), where the denominator is negative under the Taylor principle requiring
 > 1, see Woodford (2003). This denes the stationary rate of ination implicit in the
long-run solution of the empirical and optimal feedback rule.
3.3 Maximum likelihood estimation
The VAR model in equations (23) and (24) is estimated by ML. First, we estimate the para-
meters in (24) while xing the parameters 1 and 2 of the transition system (23) at their
OLS values. This gives estimates for the homoscedastic model HO and four heteroscedastic
models, labelled as LNX; LQX, GHX and ENX respectively. Next, we re-estimate all
9Appendix C.2 describes how this dynamic optimization problem is mapped into a form compatible with
equations (1), (2) and (3) for the purpose of dynamic optimization. It also describes the derivation of the
VAR under the optimal feedback rule.
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the parameters in (23) and (24) simultaneously.10
Panels A and B in Table 1 show the likelihood statistics from the ML estimates. Under
the log-likelihood ratio (LR) test, all restricted models are rejected at the 5 per cent sig-
nicance level against the unrestricted ENX model. To guard against over-tting, Table 1
also reports the di¤erence in the Schwarz approximation to the Posterior Odds ratio (SCA)
proposed by Canova (2007). Under this criterion only the HO model is rejected against the
ENX model. Panel B shows that simultaneous estimation of all parameters in equations
(23) and (24) produces a further, though modest, improvement in t.
Panels C and D in Table 1 report the coe¢ cients of the unconditional covariance matrix
of the VAR innovations, 
, implied by the ML estimates. The di¤erences in the uncondi-
tional variances across models are important in understanding the welfare results reported in
Section 3.5. Model LQX delivers the lowest unconditional variances for all three variables.
This is particularly evident for the unconditional variance of (orthogonalized) interest rate
shocks, rr. Consequently, the unconditional variances are also low under the EN (ENX)
model. The unconditional covariances are relatively stable across alternative specications
of the variance structure. In most cases, the GARCH model yields marginally lower esti-
mates of the unconditional covariances than the other models.
3.4 The optimal policy rule
Table 2 reports the long-run coe¢ cients of the interest rate equation and the rate of ination
described in section 3.2. The rst column of numbers (headed Empirical) reports the
estimates from the empirical policy rule. With the exception of model EN; these are by
construction the same for all these models. The remaining columns (headed Optimal)
report the coe¢ cients for the long-run optimal feedback rule. We consider four di¤erent
sets of welfare weights. The rst gives equal weight to the three goal variables. The others
show the e¤ect of halving the weight on each goal variable.
Reading across Table 2 shows the e¤ect of moving from the empirical to the optimal rule
under di¤erent welfare specications. Reading down this table shows the e¤ect of di¤erent
10Appendix D describes the likelihood and the impulse response functions. The results from the ML
estimates are available upon request.
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models of volatility on the policy rule, to illustrate the theoretical ndings of section 2.
We highlight the following results. First, optimization of model HO to get HO in-
creases the response coe¢ cients, with changes in the the optimal rule being consistent with
the alternative specications of the welfare weights. Second, the policy rule coe¢ cients
from model GHX are the same as in HO, since GARCH satises CE. Third, linear de-
pendence introduces a positive intercept () into the interest rate equation of model LNX,
thereby reducing steady-state ination (), while leaving the optimal response coe¢ cients
unchanged relative to models HO and GHX: Fourth, in the LQX model, quadratic
dependence also makes policy more responsive to ination. The shift in  is slightly larger
than in LNX, leading to lower steady-state ination. Fifth, the coe¢ cients from model
ENX are very similar to those in model LQX; and the intercepts are only marginally
higher. Thus the secondary e¤ects of including GARCH as well as state-dependent volatility
appear to be empirically small.11 Six, comparison of the results for ENX and EN shows
that re-estimating the transmission coe¢ cients has little e¤ect on the long-run policy rule.
3.5 Welfare analysis
Table 3 shows how heteroscedasticity a¤ects the measurement of welfare by reporting the
losses obtained from the stochastic simulation of the six models.12 The analysis is presented
along three di¤erent dimensions. The rst column of numbers illustrates how heteroscedas-
ticity a¤ects welfare under the empirical rule. The third column of numbers shows the
e¤ects under the optimal policy rule. The last column shows the welfare gains from the op-
timization of policy. In parenthesis we report the welfare changes due to di¤erent variance
structures relative to the homoscedastic model.
The rst column shows that GARCH (GHX) and linear dependence (LNX) increase the
loss, while the quadratic e¤ect reduces it. The lowest loss occurs for model LQX, consistent
with the observation in section 3.3 that this is less sensitive to interest rate shocks than
other models. The comparison of models HO and GHX suggests that adding GARCH
11This is consistent with the result in Table 1 that changes in the variance structure are mainly driven by
state-dependence rather than the GARCH.
12Appendix E describes the methodology used for the stochastic simulation.
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to model HO is broadly the same as adding GARCH to model HO.13 There is nothing
policy can do about the increase in variability, the variance of one goal variable can only be
traded o¤against that of another. In LNX however, policy can reduce the overall volatility
of the system by reducing the steady-state rate of ination (as shown in Table 2). This
mitigates the e¤ect of introducing linear state-dependent heteroscedasticity.14 Introducing
quadratic state dependence into the empirical model lowers the welfare loss (about 4% on
average across the four sets of welfare weights), but this reduction is greater (about 13% on
average) under the optimal rule. It achieves this by combining a reduction in steady-state
ination with a more aggressive policy stance.
The last column shows that the gain from optimization is generally higher when allowing
for ination-conditional volatility in the variance structure. In model LNX it is optimal to
lower the steady-state ination rate, thereby shifting the trade-o¤ and reducing the overall
volatility of the system. This makes the optimization gain bigger than in the standard
homoscedastic model, where the gain only reects increase in the level of aggression in the
systematic response of policy.15 The LQX model, which combines a shift in the steady state
with a more aggressive stance, gives an average welfare gain across the four specications
of preferences that is almost twice that implied by model HO. The welfare gains from the
optimization of model GHX are broadly the same as under model HO, since both satisfy
the CE principle. Models ENX and EN lead to an average welfare improvement, between
30-45 per cent, that is still higher than that from the optimization of the HO and GHX
models.
The numerical analysis is based on a reduced-form model. In this respect, we followed
a large literature on the implications of changes in monetary policy for macroeconomic
dynamics and welfare also based on reduced-form models like ours. Examples include
13For example, the top panel of Table 3 shows that with equal welfare weights, this increases the loss by
8.43% compared with 8.55% with the empirical rule. Introducing GARCH into LQX to get ENX also
has a similar e¤ect under the optimal rule (an increase in the loss of 100 ln(5:9=5:18) = 13%) as it does
under the empirical rule (100 ln(7:30=6:34) = 14:1%): These increases are also similar under the alternative
welfare specications shown in the other panels.
14Looking at the top panel again, this increases the welfare loss by 8.97% comparing HO and LNX but
by just 6.55% comparing HO and LNX; with similar reductions in the other panels.
15The average welfare gain across the four set of welfare specications is about 11 per cent in model HO
(compared to HO) and 17 per cent in model LNX (compared to LNX).
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Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Sack (2000), Sims and Zha (2006a, 2006b) and Polito and
Wickens (2012).
Reduced-form models are subject to the Lucas (1976) critique that the transition mech-
anism in the economy is in theory not invariant to policy changes.16 The empirical relevance
of this observation is however still debated. Our VAR model is based on Primiceri (2005)
who nds no signicant changes in the responses of ination and unemployment to the
policy rate under Burns, Volcker and Greenspan chairmanships of the Fed. Sims and Zha
(2006a, 2006b) come to a similar conclusion. Polito and Wickens (2012) also nd not sig-
nicant evidence of the sort of structural instability predicted by the Lucas critique in a
VAR of the US economy over the period 1964:2-2009:3. But to set against this evidence,
see Benati and Surico (2009) and Benati (2010).
An alternative is to use a structural model like that of Rudebusch and Svensson (1999)
that is less vulnerable to the Lucas critique. However, structural models employ dynamic
restrictions which could induce heteroscedasticity through misspecication. Nevertheless,
companion papers for the U.S., Polito and Spencer (2011a), and for the U.K., Polito and
Spencer (2011b), give results based on Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) that are similar
to those reported here, thus suggesting that these ndings are likely to be robust across a
wider range of models.
4 Conclusion
It is well known that the optimal feedback rule satises CE if volatility is homoscedastic. We
show that this result also holds in any model in which the source of change in the variance
structure is exogenous. However, volatility can also be state dependent. The CE principle no
longer holds if changes in the variance structure are endogenously driven, because volatility
a¤ects welfare and state dependence puts the policy maker in a position to inuence this.
We show that if the variance structure is linear-quadratic, a CET of the optimal linear
regulator problem can be obtained so that it resembles a standard homoscedastic model
16 In Table 3, the Lucas critique does not apply to the welfare e¤ects of heteroscedasticity under the em-
pirical rule (rst column of numbers) and the optimal rule for homoscedastic, GARCH and linear-dependent
variance (third column of numbers) since these share the same policy response coe¢ cients.
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problem. This allows the researcher to use the algorithms and insights provided by existing
methodologies.
Optimization under state-dependent volatility brings two main e¤ects. Linear state
dependence a¤ects the overall variance of the system by shifting its steady state, while
quadratic dependence changes the systematic component of policy. These two e¤ects are
mathematically equivalent to changes in the targets and welfare weights in the homoscedas-
tic linear regulator problem. If GARCH is also present, this has the e¤ect of amplifying
these shifts.
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Table 1: ML results
Likelihood and test statistics
Panel A: First stage
HO LNX LQX GHX ENX
LogL 311.20 356.70 379.70 354.40 394.00
BIC 582.92 654.19 680.45 629.85 630.10
N 6 9 12 12 24
LR test 165.60 74.60 28.60 79.20
SCA test 23.59 -12.04 -25.17 0.12
M (2M ) 18 (28.87) 15 (25) 12 (21.03) 12 (21.03)
Panel B: Second stage
HO LN LQ GH EN
LogL 311.20 359.20 397.00 370.10 401.00
BIC 464.50 540.76 596.62 542.82 565.15
N 24 27 30 30 36
LR test 179.60 83.60 8.00 61.80
SCA test -50.32 -12.19 15.73 -11.16
M (2M ) 12 (21.03) 9 (16.92) 6 (12.59) 6 (12.59)
ML estimates of the unconditional covariance matrix
Panel C: First stage of ML estimation
HO LNX LQX GHX ENX
uu 0.074 0.085 0.060 0.083 0.070
 0.104 0.113 0.100 0.110 0.115
rr 0.467 0.437 0.176 0.541 0.253
u -0.037 -0.055 -0.040 -0.079 -0.048
ur -0.577 -0.559 -0.560 -0.665 -0.605
r 0.331 0.356 0.375 0.301 0.367
Panel D: Second stage of ML estimation
LN LQ GH EN
uu 0.091 0.064 0.082 0.061
 0.120 0.105 0.110 0.106
rr 0.441 0.234 0.545 0.275
u -0.067 -0.091 -0.064 -0.085
ur -0.562 -0.576 -0.655 -0.564
r 0.342 0.358 0.299 0.348
Note: LogL is the log-likelihood; BIC is the Bayesian information
criterion; N is the number of estimated parameters; LR test is the
log-likelihood ratio test relative to EN (X); SCA test is the Schwarz
statistic. The LR and SCA tests have a 2M distribution, withM being
the number of restrictions based on the di¤erence in the parameters of
the unrestricted and restricted model. The gures in the 2M rows
are the 95% critical values. The ML estimates of the unconditional
covariance matrix are based on the solution of the matrix equation
(40) in the Online appendix.
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Table 2: Long-run responses of estimated and optimal policy rules
Empirical
Optimal
weights
u =  = r = 1
u = 0:5
 = r = 1
 = 0:5;
u = r = 1
r = 0:5;
u =  = 1
HO HO ( =  = 0)
u -0.39 -1.97 -1.51 -2.04 -2.56
 1.38 4.00 4.38 2.76 5.06
GHX GHX ( =  = 0)
u -0.39 -1.97 -1.51 -2.04 -2.56
 1.38 4.00 4.38 2.76 5.06
LNX LNX
 (-) 0.61 0.53 0.43 1.09
u -0.39 -1.97 -1.51 -2.04 -2.56
 1.38 4.00 4.38 2.76 5.06
 (-) -0.20 -0.16 -0.25 -0.27
LQX LQX
 (-) 1.04 0.93 0.71 1.90
u -0.39 -1.96 -1.52 -2.01 -2.55
 1.38 4.33 4.61 3.17 5.43
 (-) -0.31 -0.26 -0.33 -0.43
ENX ENX
 (-) 1.14 0.98 0.83 2.05
u -0.39 -1.96 -1.52 -2.01 -2.55
 1.38 4.29 4.57 3.14 5.38
 (-) -0.35 -0.27 -0.39 -0.47
EN EN
 (-) 1.76 1.29 1.23 4.57
u -0.35 -1.20 -0.95 -1.32 -1.45
 1.19 3.42 3.51 2.73 4.17
 (-) -0.73 -0.51 -0.71 -1.44
Note: the long-run interest rate rule is r = + uu+
. The intercept is zero for all models
under the empirical rule since the data is de-meaned prior to estimation and optimization, and
also for models HO and GHX since these are certainty equivalent. Linear-dependence in the
variance structure has the e¤ect of inducing a positive  intercept in the optimal feedback rule; this
reduces the steady-state ination rate by  = =(1  ) in models LNX, LQX, ENX
and EN . The loss function is described in section 3.2; u,  and r are weights attached to
unemployment, ination and changes in the rate of interest volatility respectively.
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Table 3: Welfare measurement and heteroscedasticity
Empirical rule Optimal rule
Model
Welfare
loss
change
on HO
(%)
Model/
Case
Welfare
loss
change
on HO
(%)
Gain (%)
from model
Optimisation
Case 1:  = r = 1
HO 6.61 HO 5.91 11.19
GHX 7.2 (8.55) GHX 6.43 (8.43) 11.31
LNX 7.23 (8.97) LNX 6.31 (6.55) 13.61
LQX 6.34 (-4.17) LQX 5.18 (-13.18) 20.21
ENX 7.3 (9.93) ENX 5.9 (-0.17) 21.29
EN 6.46 (-2.30) EN 4.66 (-23.76) 32.66
Case 2: u = 0:5;  = r = 1
HO 5.53 HO 4.8 14.16
GHX 6.03 (8.66) GHX 5.23 (8.58) 14.23
LNX 6.02 (8.49) LNX 5.13 (6.65) 16.00
LQX 5.29 (-4.44) LQX 4.21 (-13.12) 22.84
ENX 6.07 (9.32) ENX 4.82 (0.42) 23.06
EN 5.12 (-7.70) EN 3.67 (-26.84) 33.30
Case 3:  = 0:5; u = r = 1
HO 4.69 HO 4.44 5.48
GHX 5.13 (8.97) GHX 4.85 (8.83) 5.61
LNX 5.12 (8.77) LNX 4.72 (6.12) 8.13
LQX 4.48 (-4.58) LQX 3.95 (-11.69) 12.59
ENX 5.17 (9.74) ENX 4.47 (0.67) 14.55
EN 4.82 (2.73) EN 3.8 (-15.57) 23.78
Case 4: r = 0:5;  = u = 1
HO 6.3 HO 5.26 18.04
GHX 6.84 (8.22) GHX 5.7 (8.03) 18.23
LNX 6.93 (9.53) LNX 5.6 (6.26) 21.31
LQX 6.08 (-3.55) LQX 4.52 (-15.16) 21.65
ENX 7.01 (10.68) ENX 5.15 (-2.11) 30.83
EN 6.18 (-1.92) EN 3.96 (-28.39) 44.51
Note: This table shows the welfare losses obtained by simulating the various models under the
empirical and optimal feedback rules. Reading down the table shows the e¤ect of introducing
di¤erent models of the variance structure upon the welfare rule. Reading across this table shows
the e¤ect of moving from the empirical interest rate rule to an optimal rule under di¤erent welfare
specications. The nal column shows the logarithmic percentage increase in welfare.
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